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Abstract— With the exponential growth in the number of vital
infrastructures such as nuclear plants and transport and distri-
bution networks, these systems have become more susceptible
to coordinated cyber attacks. One of the effective approaches
used to strengthen the security of these infrastructures is the
use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance and
data collection. However, UAVs themselves are prone to attacks
on their collected sensor data. Recently, Blockchain (BC) has
been proposed as a revolutionary technology which can be
integrated within IoT to provide a desired level of security and
privacy. However, the integration of BC within IoT networks,
where UAV’s sensors constitute a major component, is extremely
challenging. The major contribution of this study is two-fold.
(1) survey of the security issues for UAV’s collected sensor data,
define the security requirements for such systems, and identify
ways to address them. (2) propose a novel Blockchain-based
solution to ensure the security of, and the trust between the
UAVs and their relevant ground control stations (GCS). Our
implementation results and analysis show that using UAVs as
means for protecting critical infrastructure is greatly enhanced
through the utilization of trusted Blockchain-based Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UASs).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Flying Adhoc Networks (FANETs) are one of Self Orga-
nized Networks (SONs) in which mobile nodes are called
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In addition to the flying
UAVs the overall system involves also ground control stations
and sometimes satellites [1]. Various innovative applications
in different domains have emerged with the development
of FANETs including agriculture, crowd sensing, frontiers
surveillance and search and rescue operations. [2], [3], to name
a few.
To ensure this variety of applications, commercial drones
(UAVs) are equipped with different sensors and cameras [4].
After gathering the sensed or captured data, a UAV; which
can be sometimes remotely controlled; sends the data to the
Ground Control Station (GCS) for further processing. At the
same time, flying UAVs can also communicate with each other
for data delivery purposes, positioning, accuracy purposes, or
even for collision avoidance purposes.
Wireless communication devices, sensors and UAVs, are
usually energy-restricted devices with low computational
power systems and thus cannot run complex cryptography pro-
cedures to protect communicated data from possible malicious
attacking entities. Thus, efficient security solutions should be
developed to overcome this shortcoming, especially for the
case of UAVs monitoring of critical infrastructures [5]. Several
solutions have already been proposed in the literature based
on both cryptography [6] and trust management [7]. However,
ensuring the desired security and privacy level in the context
of FANETs is still an open research problem with several
unresolved challenges [8].
Recently, Blockchain has been proposed as a decentralized
and auditable network where every participating node can add
reliable data to the blockchain, thus, providing security-by-
design architecture [9], [10]. Blockchain, originally designed
for the financial industry, and it is currently revolutionizing
the IoT industry including healthcare [11], supply chain [12]
and logistics [13]. However, for a highly mobile network like
FANETs, Blockchain is still in its early stage of research.
The literature demonstrates that combining peer-to-peer
swarms of UAVs will revolutionize many industrial applica-
tions [14], [15], from targeted material delivery to precision
farming, and ending with search and rescue. However, several
of the heterogeneous characteristics of drones make them ideal
for monitoring and detecting faults and malicious activities
against critical infrastructure (i.e., dams, power grids, boarders,
and even nuclear power sites.) [16], [17]. UAVs autonomy,
decentralized control, collective emergent behavior, etc. can be
of a great usage in protecting critical infrastructure facilities.
However, the lack of secure communication and trust between
drones make them more prone to possible attacks, especially
when they operate in a swarm collaborating autonomously to
monitor and provide near-real time data to a ground control
station for timely decisions. Blockchain has demonstrated
that by combining peer-to-peer networks with cryptographic
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algorithms, a group of agents can reach an agreement on a
particular state of affairs and record that agreement without
the need for a controlling authority. The combination of
Blockchain with other distributed systems, such as a UAV
swarm system, can provide the necessary capabilities to make
UAVs operations more secure, autonomous, flexible and even
profitable. Benefits from the security features provided by
the blockchain technology, where there is a need for reliable
and trustworthy systems is self-evident. Also, authentication
of involved entities and integrity of exchanged data is very
crucial.
In order to ensure trustworthiness of desired data for differ-
ent FANET applications, we propose a novel blockchain-based
trust management solution for Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UASs) communication. Our proposal named Blockchain-
based Unmanned Aerial System (BUAS). BUAS involves
different communicating domains staring from the UAV em-
bedded sensors to the Blockchain. In addition, BUAS is also
based on the Bayesian Inference (BI) approach [18] which is
known to offer high accuracy when estimating a given event
credibility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we provide an overview about the Unmanned Aerial Systems,
their security requirements, and we discuss existing solutions.
Section III introduces our domain-based architecture (BUAS),
and its performance is evaluated in Section IV. Lastly, we
conclude the paper in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section we present the components of the unmanned
aerial systems, their adversary model, security requirements,
and we discuss existing security solutions in the context of
UASs
A. UASs Components
UAS refers to the system of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),
their ground control station (GCS), and communication tech-
nologies linking the UAVs and their GCS. The literature
describes many designs of UAVs and GCS, where every design
depends on the applications of these systems. However, most
UASs share the following main components [19].
1) Unmanned aerial vehicles modules: Fig. 1 represents the
UAVs main components together with their interactions [19]:
• Data acquisition: This module is responsible for gather-
ing sensor data.
• Navigation system: This module contains the UAVs mis-
sion. The accuracy of the mission’s different points can
be improved through the use of a GPS as an additional
module.
• Control module: Once the data gathered, this module
is then responsible for delivering the data to the ground
control station.
• Data logging module: Same as any sensors-based sys-
tem, a temporary cache is used to save the data until its













Fig. 1: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles modules
2) Ground control station modules:
• Operator: It represents the agent controlling the UAV
during its mission. The operator can either be a person
or a pre-loaded program.
• Data storage: Upon receiving the data collected by the
UAVs, this module stores it before further processing.
• Data analysis: This is the most important module, it
analyzes the data received from the GCS in order to make
flight decisions.
B. UASs Adversary model
In UASs an attacker can target hardware devices, software
applications or communications. These attackers can be clas-
sified into three categories:
1) Adversaries targeting software: The software compo-
nent is a fundamental element that provides control of hard-
ware and applications. The mobile operating system and
applications installed on GCS or other smart devices are
susceptible to some vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow
or code injection after jailbreaking the operating system. An
attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to gain access to
some services or in worst case scenarios control the UAV. For
instance, a malicious entity can direct a UAVs weapon against
defined targets, it can also corrupt data or inject falsified
information. Security mechanisms must prevent unauthorized
access and the execution of malicious code in the boot and
the operation phases.
2) Adversaries targeting Hardware: Payloads on UAV such
as camera, GPS, and storage devices are preferable targets for
attackers. When an attacker becomes successful in controlling
these devices, he/she can change the mission path or capture
the UAV by falsifying the GPS positions. The attacker can then
modify images captured by the camera, changes the angle of
view (AOV) or destroys the UAV by disturbing the sensing
devices and exhausting the power sources. These attacks can
be achieved using malicious software or via hijacking the
communication channels.
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3) Adversaries targeting communications: The primary
goal of such an adversary is to maliciously alter or damage the
network functionality. In such cases, an attacker can eavesdrop,
modifies or deletes data in-transit. The increased number of
applications based on communication, broadens the attack
surface. Thus, most of the attacks carried out in Wireless
Sensor Network (WSN), Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) or
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) can be launched against
UAV communications. Even though, the data link represents
an attractive choice for attackers, in UAVs, the control link
between the GCS and the aircraft, is still the preferred target.
Hence, by employing simple techniques such as jamming or
spoofing, an adversary can be successful in interrupting the
normal operations of UAVs.
C. UASs Security requirements
1) Confidentiality: Ensuring that communication informa-
tion among UAVs cannot be retrieved by a man-in-the-middle
is critical requirement of any security system. Encryption is
usually used to prevent devastating consequences of informa-
tion leakage. However, many challenges such as limited power
and computing resources have to be considered especially in
the case of UAVs.
2) Integrity and message authentication: In Non-Line of
Sight (NLOS) scenarios, receiving messages from on-board
UAV devices is not possible. Routing protocols can be used, in
such cases, as an alternative solution. In this case, the message
can be forwarded by means of another UAV or a ground nodes
(sensor, vehicle, IoT device, etc.). However, man-in-the-middle
attack cannot be avoided, and an attacker may change the
content of the message. Therefore, detecting and preventing
any alteration of message is an important requirements in any
communication scenario in UASs.
3) Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is the ability to pre-
vent a sender from denying the generation of a messages
or denying the content of a message. This requirement is
important, especially, when a UAV oversteps boundaries for
instance it can deny sending images or messages from a
restricted area.
4) Authentication: The identity of an UAV should be veri-
fied in order to distinguish a legitimate UAV from an unautho-
rized one. Public key certificates can be used to authenticate
the identity of the user. Moreover, in some applications such
as in swarms, and traffic control, UAVs may use valid keys
only for small intervals of time. Thus, for efficiency of security
solutions, a set of valid keys must be pre-loaded before UAV
release.
5) Access control: The variety of UAV applications requires
communication mechanisms among different devices, that may
have multiple identities (e.g. vehicles). Hence, ensuring that
only authorized entities can connect to an UAV service or
device is mandatory. As part of access control, access poli-
cies can be predefined, for each service, protocol or device,
depending on the type of UAV (e.g. Police UAV, Ambulance,
commercial).
6) Availability: Availability is ensuring the correct func-
tionality of UAV modules, including communications, despite
denial of service (DoS) attacks. In the case of UAVs, a
DoS attack could be launched at any layer. Physical layer
DoS attack targeting GPS services are the most cited in the
literature [20]–[22]. But, media access control, networking
(routing), or application layers represent an easy target to any
adversary launching a DoS attack.
7) Trust and privacy: Finally, an evaluation and establish-
ment of trustworthiness between the flying UAVs and their
sensors must be available for both UAVs and their Ground
Control Stations. Furthermore, the different kinds of privacy
must be ensured for all UAS actors (UAVS, GSC, monitors
...) [23].
D. Existing UASs Security solutions
Although FANETs are among the hottest research topics,
there still exists a lack of UAS-dedicated security solutions
ensuring the aforementioned requirements.
Authors of [29] analyzed the UAV radio communication
systems. They mainly studied the security of the data trans-
ferred between the SAMONIT (Polish UAV project Aircraft
for monitoring) and other entities. However, this research
focused on the cryptography aspects without taking into ac-
count the restrictions imposed on the resources of UAVs. On
the other hand, the work in [30], [31] studied the adversary
model of UAVs together with some proposed solutions. Both
papers focus on providing a clear review of the security issues,
adversaries and the possible solutions.
Since UAS is based on an open communication medium
and a GPS-based positioning system, most of the research
is focusing on mitigating GPS jamming and spoofing attacks
[32]. The authors of [33] showed that UAVs relying on GPS
systems during their missions are vulnerable to jamming
attacks. In [34], authors revealed the viability of spoofing
commercial GPS due to the lack of encryption. Both attacks
can lead to the loss of critical UAVs.
Radu et al. designed a multi-path routing protocol (called
MP-OLSR) to disseminate data packets among the nodes
in FANETs during emergency scenarios [24]. Although, the
proposed routing protocol performs well for emergency ap-
plications, the methodology of how this protocol reacts to
malicious nodes is not discussed by the authors. Furthermore,
Zhang et al. discussed the issues of eavesdropping in UAV-
ground communication, where the potential eavesdropper can
intercept the communication due to unknown channel-state
information (CSI) [25]. To solve these issues, the authors
proposed a physical layer-based solution which relies on
adjusting UAV trajectory and transmitting power over a given
flight time.
Recently, trust is studied as an alternative measure to secure
UAVs. For instance, Singh et al. proposed a trust model to
secure UAVs based on the genetic algorithm, which plays a
vital role in calculating various involved parameters [26]. The
authors further extended this trust model by using fuzzy-logic
to classify nodes into three distinct level, i.e., good nodes,
average nodes and bad nodes [27]. Simulation results of these
trust models ensure promising results for detecting malicious
UAVs in the presence of a high number of nodes. However,
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TABLE I: Comparison of Trust Management Schemes in FANET
Study Year Details Attacker Model Drawback
Radu et al. [24] 2018 Multi-path routing for FANET - How it behave in presence of malicious nodes?
Zhang et al. [25] 2019 Physical layer security to deal eavesdropbetween UAV-ground communication Eavesdrop How this solution will work in no-fly zones?
Singh et al. [26] 2018 Trust based on genetic algorithm Selfish nodes Poor performance for network with highmalicious nodes
Singh et al. [27] 2018 Fuzz-logic based trust model Selfish nodes Poor performance for network with lowlegitimate nodes
Yuan et al. [28] 2017 Trust connectivity for overlaid UAV network Selective forwarding High number of nodes required to maintaincommunication link
Proposed 2019 Trust model based on blockchain and BI Malicious fake reports PoW computational and time complexity
this approach fails to detect malicious UAVs correctly when
the network involves a low quantity of legitimate nodes. Yuan
et al. further studied the issue of trust connectivity for overlaid
UAV networks, where communication links between the nodes
is established only if the achieved trust satisfies the minimum
trust threshold [28]. This scheme requires high number of
UAVs in order to establish trust. The main limitation of this
proposal is building trust model in a network comprised of a
limited number of UAVs.
In a nutshell, we can see that trust as a security measure
is recently introduced in FANET to secure UAVs as depicted
in Table I. It also depicts that the current trust management
schemes for FANET have several issues in terms of security.
In order to solve these issues, we proposed a novel trust
management scheme based on blockchain, namely BUAS. In
the next section, we provide details of our proposed trust
model.
III. BUAS: A TRUSTED UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM
USING BLOCKCHAIN
In BUAS, we show how blockchain technology can be inte-
grated with our UAV system to provide innovative solutions for
trusted and secure communication in a collaborative decision-
making, behavior differentiation when they are deployed in
rural locations to protected critical infrastructure. This section
describes the overall architecture of UAVs, its operations, and
how UAVs trust is managed by using the recently emerged
Blockhain technology.
A. Architecture of BUAS
BUAS is composed of three domains: i) UAV domain ii)
Ground Control domain, and iii) Blockchain-enabled Infras-
tructure domain. In the following we explain the tasks of these
three domains as shown in Fig. 2.
1) UAV domain: This domain includes the UAVs and their
sensors which mostly transmit their data through wireless
channel. For instance, drones are equipped with communica-
tion capabilities and continuously communicate with the back-
end application center via wireless communication protocols.
This domain is helpful in the generation of the useful infor-
mation which needs to be disseminated across the network.
2) Ground Control domain: This domain acts as a com-
munication middle-ware and is responsible for sharing the
message generated from the UAVs with the back-end in-
frastructure. Further, Base Stations in this domain can act
as cluster heads to transmit information towards back-end
network in order to record data into the Blockchain.
3) Blockchain-enabled Infrastructure domain: This domain
is the back-end domain of BUAS architecture which is
equipped with BC. Miners are first elected in this domain
based on their capability to solve the complex PoW puzzle.
When the data from the UAVs is received at the miners via
communication domain, the Miners first validates the informa-
tion based on the consensus algorithm. Once, the PoW puzzle
is solved by the miner, the data can be added within the BC.
The block in BUAS has two major components, i.e., (1) Block
header, and (2) Block data. Block header contains the Proof-
of-Work Hash which includes control related information such
as version number, Nonce value, previous block information,
merkle trees and a timestamp. Block data contains the list of
the transactions which are recorded by the miners after solving
the PoW algorithm.
B. Operation of BUAS
BUAS takes advantage of blockchain to provide a secure
and trusted connectivity between the UAVs and their final
users. It operates in three parallel phases:
• First, the UAV sensor generates information which needs
to be propagated to the ground control domain. This
information contains highly sensitive data including ac-
cident warnings in smart transportation, or user’s private
information for some rescue scenarios.
• Afterwards, it comes the dissemination of the information
over communication channel. To achieve this purpose,
any available communication medium can be used. Sim-
ilarly, for delay-tolerant information, the data and infor-
mation can be aggregated at the Ground Controllers level,
then transported to the third domain via Base Stations.
• Finally, the miners at the third domain can add, modify
and record the information into the BC after solving the
PoW algorithm. Miners are the only responsible nodes
which can add the data into BC. However, the data is
not added to the BC if miner is unable to solve PoW
consensus algorithm.
C. Trust Management in BUAS
From the data acquisition to the blockchain registration
several procedures are invoked. The overall process can be
summarized in the following four phases: First, Rating gen-
eration and uploading; Second, Trust’s offsets computation;
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Fig. 2: Proposed Architecture for Blockchain in UAS
Third, Miners selection and generation of blocks; And fourth,
the distributed consensus.
1) UAVs Trust Evaluation: The first phase is the Rating
generation and uploading: Communicating UAVS have to
evaluate the exchanged messages to evaluate their trustwor-
thiness. Firstly, the UAV receiving message divides them into
groups {M1;M2; ...Mj ; ..}, in which Mj is the group of
messages reporting a same event ej such as ”fire detected
in position (x,y). However, messages within the same group
may not have the same trustworthiness. The ones reported by
UAVs close to the event are usually more trustworthy than the
ones reported by remote UAVs. Hence, the trustworthiness of
a message is given by the following equation [35]:
trjk = α+ e
−β·Distjk (1)
where trjk is the trustworthiness of a given message be-
longing to Mj provided by a UAV k. Dist
j
k is the distance
separating the originator of the message (reporting UAV) and
the position in which the event has occured. α and β represent
two predefined weights controlling the lower bound and the
update value of message trustworthiness.
Furthermore, trjk= 0 if the UAV k did not generate and
report about the event j. Through the use of the following
equation, the trustworthiness set TRj can be obtained by
the receiving UAV for event ej , where TRj = {trj1; tr
j
1...}.
Based on the trustworthiness set T , afterwards, the UAV can
estimate the overall trustworthiness/confidence about an event











where ē represents the nonexistence of the event e.
P (trk/e) = trk · P (trk/ē) = 1 − trk. P (e) is the previous
probability of a given event e. With P (e/TR) ∈ [0, 1].
Upon reaching a value of P (e/TR) higher than a predefined
threshold TH , the UAV receiving the messages regarding an
event e can decide that this event has truly occurred, and hence,
it generates positive ratings (+1) on messages reporting this
event and vice versa for the events with P (e/TR) < TH (-1).
Last but no least, UAVs periodically send their estimations
(ratings) to the close ground control station. The format of
these estimations is (#UAVi; #UAVj ;mk; rating), where
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#UAVi and #UAVj are the number of UAVs receiving and
reporting an event, respectively; mk is the message’s ID; and
the evaluation (rating) takes -1 for trusted messages or +1
untrusted messages.
The second phase which consist of the Trust’s offsets
computation: After receiving the UAVs different ratings, the
GCS may face conflicting ratings for a given message, for
instance, 8 positive ratings and 5 negative ratings. For our
case, weighted aggregation is used to obtain the trust’s offset
∈ [−1,+1] using the following equation:
λjk =
ϕ1 · pos− ϕ2 · neg
pos+ neg
(3)
where λjk is the trust’s of UAV k based on message j and λ
j
k
∈ [-1; 1]. pos and neg are the number of positive and negative
ratings, whose weights are ϕ1 and ϕ2, respectively. ϕ1 and ϕ2








Under the assumption that an attacker can only control a
minority of the population (UAVs in our case), K(.) is used to
control the sensitivity to the minority group of ratings. Finally,
the Ground Control Station regroup the different trust offsets
in a set θ and tries to include it into the blockchain.
The third phase consisting of Miners selection and genera-
tion of blocks: One of the main advantages and challenges
at the same time of blockchain is the fully distributed ar-
chitecture. Hence, miners should be periodically selected so
they can generate new blocks of offset. Usually, the selection
is based on proof-of-work algorithm. Hence, all peers keep
changing the nonce and compute the blocks’ new hash values
with the newly changed nonce. Afterward, all peers generated
hash values are compared with a threshold, the one getting the
hash value lower than a threshold is selected as the miner and
is able to publish its block. All nodes have the same threshold,
which makes nodes with more powerful computation capacity
easier to get the right nonce and win the election. On the other
hand, to ensure certain fairness the miners selection, the proof-
of-stake is also used so that different peers have different hash
thresholds, and by consequence different time requirements to
generate blocks.
An alternative solution is to use both proof-of-work and
proof-of-stake miner selection at the same time as proposed
in [35], they propose to take as a stake the sum of the absolute
compensations and that the difficulty of completing the proof
of work depends on the stake. GCS with more stakes can easily
find the nonce and thus be selected and publish its blocks
quickly, which guarantees the fast update of the data stored
in the blockchain. The following part summarize the proof-of-
work and proof-of-stake hybridization:
Hash(IDRSU , time, PreHash, nonce) 6 Si (5)
where Si is the hash threshold for GCSi. And as mentioned
above all GCS continuously change their nonce. Thus, once
a CS gets the nonce that satisfies the above condition it gets
selected. Si increases while increasing Fi, it is defined as the
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θi represent the current offset set of the GCS i. Hence, the
GCS with higher value of Qi is likely to be selected and then
publish its block. Using this strategy, a huger number of trust
evaluations guarantees the fast update blockchain. Qmax is the
upper bound of Qi used to ensure the fair miner selection and
prevent GCS with high value of Qi from continuously wining
the selection. After publishing its blocks, the GCS selected as
a miner clears the elements in θi.
Same as all blockchain-based systems, the construction of
Si: Si is series of binary bits starting by a number of zeros.
Here, the relationship between Si and Qi is given by the
following equation [35]:
Nz = int(e
−(η·Qi+υ)), Si = 2
Nm−Nz − 1 (7)
int(.) is a function returning the integer part of the intro-
duced value as a parameter; Nz is the number of zeros with
which Si starts; and Nm is generated hash value depending
on the considered hashing function.
The fourth and final phase is the distributed consensus:
Upon receiving a miner’s block, the server in the blockchain-
enable infrastructure domain checks the nonce’s validity then
add it to the blockchain. However, a given server may receive a
large number of blocks simultaneously. Thus, the blockchain
may start to fork. To face this problem, a distributed con-
sensus strategy should be used. Servers will chose to fork
one block and continue adding new blocks. Afterwards, the
fork recognized by the largest number of servers is growing
faster than others. In the end, the longest one becomes the
distributed consensus of the network and the remaining ones
will be removed. Furthermore, the servers will gather their
generated blocks in the removed forks and try adding them to
the blockchain later. Using this strategy all servers are holding
the same copy of the blockchain.
2) Malicious UAVs revocation: In our proposal, Ground
Control Station notifies the UAVs with low trust evaluations,
therefor they can adjust their behavior accordingly before
getting dismissed from all network operations. To this end,
two thresholds (THwarning and THrevocation) are used such
that to punish the UAVs with unwanted behavior, where
THwarning > THrevocation. UAVs having trust evaluation
higher than THrevocation and lower than THwarning are
added the a grey list and will be later notified to push them to
operate honestly. As for the UAVs with trust evaluation lower
than THrevocation, they are blacklisted and revoked from all
network operations.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate performance of BUAS, we have implemented
its different modules in the NS-3 simulator. The theoretical
communication range of UAVs is assumed to be 300m radius
of the sphere created around their positions. In addition, UAVs
are moving following the 3D random Waypoint Mobility
Model with roughly 30m altitude. Simulated area is considered
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to be 16 km2 with 4 Ground Control Stations. Furthermore,
we assume that 10 events occur in the 5 randomly distributed
critical infrastructures. On the other hand, 10% then 20%
of the UAVs are considered malicious reporting fake events.
The total simulation duration is 600 sec for each of the
10 runs. We first created a local blockchain on our system,
where all the nodes are containers and these containers are
created on the same system. Afterwards, to run our simulations
we connected every node with each other in NS3 simula-
tion. Another way which we did not use is the “Bitcoin-
Simulator” which is developed in NS3 and freely available
through: “https://github.com/arthurgervais/Bitcoin-Simulator”
We did not use this last solution mainly because we needed
more flexibility in managing the different domains of our
proposal, something that we could not achieve using Bitcoin-
Simulator.
The rest simulation parameters are summarized in Table II:
TABLE II: Simulation parameters.
Parameters Value
Simulated region (km×km) 4×4
Simulation duration (s) 600
Number of UAVs [10,100]
UAVs communication range (m) 300
UAVs speed (km/h) [0,40]






Message size (bytes) 500
Block size (bytes) 5000
In the following we discuss BUAS performance in terms of
detection ratio, trust’s variation, generated falses when moni-
toring critical infrastructures, Blockchain generated overhead,
and finally UAVs energy consumption with and without our
proposal.
Fig. 3 represents the achieved detection ratio when varying
the UAVs density in the simulated area for both 10% and
20% malicious UAVs ratio. It depicts that, except for very
sparse cases when UAVs cannot monitor each other, BUAS
can offer high detection ratios exceeding the 95%. This is
mainly due to the efficient majority-based Bayesian Inference
trust management technique.
On the other hand, Fig. 4 shows the relation between trust
offsets and the ratio of negative ratings for four different K(.)
functions (K(x) = x, K(x) = x2, K(x) = x3, and K(x) =
ex). It depicts that the offsets decrease with the increase of
negative ratings ranging between -1 and +1. It is clear that
different K(x) may have different effects on trust’s offsets.
For instance, the cases of K(x) = x3 and K(x) = ex are less
vulnerable compared to K(x) = x and K(x) = x2 when the
negative ratings ratio is less than 40%.
To show the importance of BUAS for securing critical
infrastructures we concentrated all event withing the 5 crit-
ical infrastructures, and measured the generated positive and
negative false of BUAS compared to UNION [36] and RPM
[37] when detecting fake events. The results show that the
Number of UAVs

















Fig. 3: Detection ratios of BUAS for different dishonesty ratios
Negative ratings ratio [%]

















Fig. 4: Trust’s offsets in respect of the ration of negative
ratings.
blockchain-based strategy of BUAS have clearly reduced the
generated errors compared to the classical solutions (without
blockchain) with less than 3% false negative and less than 1.5
% false positive in the worst cases. Whereas, both UNION
and RPM generate higher errors that cannot be accepted for
critical infrastructures cases (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 6).
The use of blockchain in BUAS involves more exchanged
messages betwwen the different domains. Fig. 7 shows the
generated overhead for different UAVs densities. It shows
that even for the very dense scenario (100 UAVs), generated
overhead did not exceeded the 5Kb, which does not affect
the network operation because of the very small exchanged
packets.
In addition, when pushing the inter-UAV trust evaluation
towards Blockchain, this will not affect the UAVs energy
consumption compared to the in-UAV complex computations.
Fig. 8 shows that the energy consumption is almost the same
with and without BUAS, and this is one of the most important
advantages of BUAS lightweight trust establishment solution,
especially for the case of energy-restricted devices like UAVs.
To evaluate the scalability of BUAS at the level of the
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Fig. 5: Generated false positive of BUAS compared to both
UNION and RPM.
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Fig. 6: Generated false negative of BUAS compared to both
UNION and RPM.
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Fig. 7: Generated overhead due to Blockchain usage.
‘Blockchain-enabled Infrastructure Domain’, we performed
two tasks: First, we fixed the GCSs messaging rate at 50
messages per second, and second, we increased both the
Time [s]



























Fig. 8: UAVs average consumed energy with and without
BUAS.
number of GCSs and the number of servers. Fig. 9 represents
the communication throughput in respect of the number GCSs.
It shows that the number of validated transactions increased
with the increase of the GCSs (miners) until reaching a
stability with more than 15 miners which are enough to timely
validate all coming transactions. This is explained by the fact
that more than 15 GCSs are required to cover all the simulated
area. Hence, all transactions are received by GCSs in a timely
manner without any UAVs mobility-related delay.
On the other hand, Fig. 10 represents the network latency
while changing the number of GCSs. It shows that with
the increase in number of GCSs, the latency in the network
increases as well. Overall, we can say that the use of PoW
affected negatively the system scalability due to its high time
and computation complexity.
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Fig. 9: Throughput-related performance of BUAS.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Critical infrastructures such as nuclear plants, transmission,
and distribution grids, are widely deployed nowadays. In
addition, these systems have become more prone to coordi-
nated cyber-physical attacks. This work proposes ”BUAS”
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Fig. 10: Latency-related performance of BUAS.
a blockchain-based inter-UAV trust evaluation solution for
securing critical infrastructures. Our proposal is a domain-
based architecture involving all the Unmanned Aerial Systems
components together with the blockchain-enabled servers to
ensure the lightest and most efficient possible solution secur-
ing critical infrastructures. Simulation results show that with
high detection ratios, low energy consumption, and reduced
overhead, BUAS can offer very accurate decisions which is a
requirement especially for the critical infrastructures case.
As a future work, we plan to extend BUAS with more
modules ensuring other needs such as Geofencing and privacy
protection in UASs. In addition, another lightweight consensus
algorithm would clearly enhance the overall performance and
this will also be our future work.
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ad hoc network for emergency applications connected to a fog system,”
in Advances in Internet, Data & Web Technologies, L. Barolli, F. Xhafa,
N. Javaid, E. Spaho, and V. Kolici, Eds. Cham: Springer International
Publishing, 2018, pp. 675–686.
[25] G. Zhang, Q. Wu, M. Cui, and R. Zhang, “Securing uav communications
via joint trajectory and power control,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 1376–1389, Feb 2019.
[26] K. Singh and A. K. Verma, “A trust model for effective cooperation
in flying ad hoc networks using genetic algorithm,” in International
Conference on Communication and Signal Processing (ICCSP), April
2018, pp. 0491–0495.
[27] K. Singh and A. K. Verma, “FCTM: A novel fuzzy classification trust
model for enhancing reliability in flying ad hoc networks (fanets),” Ad
Hoc Sensor Wireless Networks, vol. 40, pp. 23–47, 2018.
[28] X. Yuan, Z. Wei, Z. Feng, and W. Xu, “Trust connectivity analysis
in overlaid unmanned aerial vehicle networks,” in 17th International
Symposium on Communications and Information Technologies (ISCIT),
Sep. 2017, pp. 1–6.
[29] D. Rudinskas, Z. Goraj, and J. Stankūnas, “Security analysis of uav radio
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